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INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
David Palmeter*
Lawyers are trained to study the past - cases and statutes
- and to attempt to provide for the future - draft contracts or
wills, advise or counsel. But we lawyers have no professional crys-
tal ball that permits us see the future any better than anyone
else. Hence, a lawyer's attempt to predict what international law
will be in the twenty-first century is a hazardous undertaking,
particularly so because most, if not all, of that law will be dictated
by developments in areas other than in law itself - develop-
ments in politics, in technology, in economics, in war, and in
peace.
This certainly is true of the law of international trade as now
embodied in the legal instruments of the World Trade Organiza-
tion and, for nearly half a century before that, in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Politics and economics have
controlled the development of GATT law; few would suggest that
the reverse has been the case, although GATT law certainly con-
tributed to its own further development as experience taught
policy makers what they did and did not like about GATT law as
it was evolving.
GATT initially was seen as a diplomatic forum where parties
compromised disagreements, not as a court that decided them.
Its law developed through what is now called "dispute settle-
ment," but what earlier was called "conciliation." The diplo-
matic tradition is strong - in 1992, for example, GATT's annual
publication, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, pub-
lished reports of dispute settlement panels under the heading
"Conciliations."' With adoption of the WTO's "Understanding
on Dispute Settlement," however, the juridical model clearly has
prevailed. This is what the WTO will take into the twenty-first
century.
Some bemoan the increasing judicialization of GATT and
its successor, the WTO. Apart from the usual fears of turning
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everything over to the lawyers, many trade diplomats are con-
cerned that legalities will drive flexibility out of the system. Per-
haps this is true, but it remains to be seen whether this is unde-
sirable: one person's flexibility is another's unbridled discre-
tion. The power to be flexible includes the power to twist, if not
to ignore, the rules. A flexible trade regime grounded in diplo-
macy is a regime dominated by the powerful. This does not nec-
essarily disconcert the powerful, who usually are convinced of
the benignity of their own policies and intentions, sometimes
justifiably so. Still, as Professor Francis Allen has said, "In this
sinful world, when the lion and the lamb lie down together the
lamb is usually in the interior of the lion."' A system of rules is
better for the lamb than a system of interests pursued by
strength on a dispute-by-dispute basis, as the latter will all but
guarantee the lamb a journey to the interior of the lion when-
ever the lion is displeased.
Lions that agree to rule-based systems, however, have the
lions' share of the say in establishing the content of those rules.
The rules of the WTO clearly reflect the views of its lions, partic-
ularly the United States and the European Union. For example,
the WTO's loose rules on agriculture reflect the results of their
battle. The lambs counted for little in the. struggle, although
their stake was enormous.3 Similarly, the standards of review
contained in the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code4 are there
simply because of the insistence of the United States and its
power to get its way, at least when not opposed vigorously by the
EU.5
These results seem inevitable; in any political regime the
strong are likely to have their way. For this reason, the well-be-
ing of the lambs, paradoxically, is likely to be furthered by a
modest approach to developing WTO law, as is the well-being of
the WTO legal system itself.
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
The core constitutional articles of GATT were its first three:
Article I required most-favored-nation treatment; Article II
bound tariffs at existing levels; Article III mandated national
treatment. Had these been phrased as commandments to con-
tracting parties, they would have said something like, "Thou
shalt not discriminate between foreign suppliers; thou shalt not
increase thy existing level of protection; thou shalt not discrimi-
nate against imports in thy internal market." That effectively is
what they said and, though subject to exceptions, they worked
quite well, so well in fact that they are continued in the in the
Agreement Establishing the WTO.'
The virtue of provisions like these is that they establish a
framework within which governments are free to act with mini-
mal interference: so long as they do not discriminate, so long as
they do not erect new trade barriers, governments can do
whatever they wish. They may set their own environmental stan-
dards, their own health and safety standards, and their own labor
policies. There is minimal interference from the international
legal norm.
Of course, what governments choose to do with regard to
such matters as environmental standards, health and safety stan-
dards, and labor policies will have some impact on their trade
performance. This has led some to advocate inclusion of sub-
stantive rules in the WTO covering these and other areas of law
such as antitrust law. In my view, this would be a mistake. Sub-
stantive rules of necessity are intrusive. While no doubt they ad-
vance notions of the good entertained by their supporters, they
limit the freedom of governments to adopt their own policies,
and this in turn risks erosion of the political support needed to
sustain the WTO and its rules. The more those who wish to act
domestically are frustrated by international rules, the less they
will support the international rules.
If the people of this planet have succeeded in putting the
6. The Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods contains the three provisions
verbatim, as GATI" 1994'adopts the provisions of GATT 1947. Articles 3 and 4 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") cover
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment, respectively. Services are more
complex. Article II of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ('GATS") calls for
MEFN treatment, but this requirement is subject to explicit exceptions. In addition,
TRIPS, unlike GATT and GATS, does contain affirmative, minimum standards; this
comes, however, against the background of more than a century of experience with
international agreements dealing with intellectual property.
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nuclear genie back in the bottle, this struggle between the desire
to act locally and the need to cooperate internationally will be
the struggle of the twenty-first century. John Kenneth Galbraith
has called it the "basic dialectic - the rights of individual sover-
eignty against the gains from closer union."7
International trade law is about the gains from closer union.
The cost of those gains is, in national terms, diminished sover-
eignty; in personal terms, diminished control of our own lives.
As with any necessary costs, these should be minimized at the
same time the very real gains for which they are exchanged are
maximized. The lesson of the forty-seven largely successful years
of GATT is that these costs can be minimized by minimizing the
intrusiveness of the international rules. WTO law in the twenty-
first century will be better law, more effective law, if its develop-
ment is guided by the words of Grant Gilmore who returns us to
the metaphor of the lion and the lamb:
The values of a reasonably just society will reflect themselves
in a reasonably just law. The better the society, the less law
there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion
will lie down with the lamb. The values of an unjust society
will reflect themselves in an unjust law. The worse the society,
the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but
law, and due process will be meticulously observed.8
We may be closer to Gilmore's due process Hell than we
think. "Our statute books," Judge Richard A. Posner has written,
"overflow with vicious, exploitive, inane, ineffectual, and extrava-
gantly costly laws."9 Few now would apply these terms to the law
of international trade as established by the WTO, although all
but perhaps "ineffectual" might be applied to the WTO An-
tidumping Code. It would be wise, nevertheless, to keep Judge
Posner's adjectives in mind when evaluating proposals to turn
the WTO into a substantive environmental, labor, or antitrust
organization as well as a trade organization. New areas bring
new players, new interest groups, new lobbies, new rent-seekers
- all with their own agendas. Their activities produced many of
the domestic laws Judge Posner described, taking us closer to
Gilmore's total "due process."
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Long before international trade law comes to that point,
however, it most likely either will be rejected outright, or by des-
uetude, allowed to become irrelevant. Overreaching would turn
the WTO Agreement into an economic Kellogg-Briand Pact, the
WTO itself into an economic League of Nations. There would
then be no useful international trade law in the twenty-first cen-
tury. And that, indeed, would be tragic.
